A young generation left-behind

Much ink has been spilled on the subject of internal migration in the PR China. In light of the tremendous social, economic and political repercussions of this unparalleled movement from rural to urban areas, this shouldn't come as a big surprise.

The sheer magnitude is truly mind-blowing: according to a recent report (in Chinese) by the National Bureau of Statistics, the number of rural migrant workers stood at approximately 262,61 million at the end of 2012 (and that's a rather conservative estimate).

They constitute the immense mass of what Chinese media used to label 'worker-turned-peasants (nongmingong)' who have left their villages in search of work and better lives in China's booming cities. Without these millions upon millions of construction workers, factory hands, small traders, waitresses, salespersons or domestic helpers, the spectacular take off of the Chinese economy would have been all but impossible.

What is largely missing in the grand narrative of mass migration and modernization is the view back to the rural places of origin. Internal migration has not only fundamentally altered the structure of urban society, but also living and working conditions in the countryside. Only gradually, the often precarious situation of a special group that is commonly being called 'the left-behind (liushouzhe)' has been noticed.

The term 'left-behind', 'liushou' in Chinese, literally means 'those who stay and hold the fort'.

Interestingly, the Chinese and English terms have entirely different connotations. While the English expression implies that the left-behind could have been brought along, the Chinese word denotes the exact opposite, namely the expectation that migrants would return eventually (see this early paper by Xiang Biao).

This new and numerically very significant social group consists predominantly of married women, the elderly and children. As living expenses in cities are extremely high and access to services and social welfare (such as education, healthcare or affordable housing) is limited for rural migrant workers, many peasant families opt for a strategy of household separation to keep costs and risks down. The left-behind often pay a high price for the income-generating activities of their family members outside the village. And children are obviously the most vulnerable in absence of one or both parents.

The most recent survey from May 2013 found a total number of slightly more than 61 million 'left-behind children (liushou haizi or liushou ertong)' nationwide, an increase of 2,42 million over the past five years. Hence, they currently comprise 37.7% of the total population of rural children and a whopping 21.88% of the total population of children countrywide. Their numbers are especially high in the five provinces of Sichuan, Henan, Anhui, Guangdong and Hunan. With respect to primary caregivers, the survey revealed that 32.67% of the children lived with their grandparents, 10.7% lived with unspecified others and a worrying 3.37% were entirely on their own.

Very little is known about the everyday lives of these children, but several studies have pointed out that they doubtlessly constitute a risk group - and particularly so in the absence of both parents.

Frequent accidents and injuries, poor academic performance, higher than usual school drop-out rates, loneliness, developmental issues, low self-esteem, mental health problems and a proclivity for anti-social behaviour and juvenile delinquency have been identified as major concerns so far (for a recent assessment by two Chinese scholars, see here).

Rural communities and local authorities have been slow to address the manifold difficulties created by the long-term separation of rural households. Only recently, there have been several initiatives to improve the situation of left-behind children in home villages by way of sponsorships between teachers and students, for instance.

Charities, too, have started new projects to ease the heavy burden of overtaxed grandparents and provide better care and supervision.

Regrettably, the central government has made no move to support these stakeholders until now. But if there isn't a comprehensive effort to tackle the problem, a whole generation of rural offspring that has been deprived of family live and the care of parents might pose serious challenges for Chinese society and social stability in the future (for an excellent and encompassing article about the phenomenon of left-behind children, including field work in Hunan province, see here).

To catch a glimpse of the predicament of left-behind children and their migrant parents, take a look at the video below in which independent Chinese researcher Lin Zhibin tells their stories.

The video was recorded by citizen journalists Hermann Aubie, Kanako Kuramitsu, Ning Ninghu and Dragon Film Factory during the EU-China Civil Society Dialogue on Left-Behind Children in February 2012.

The Chinese Communist Party is doomed

Painted portrait of Xi Jinping :: © Thierry Ehrmann :: Flickr :: CC BY 2.0

If you are inclined to go along with the view of one highly influential China scholar based in the US, at least. David Shambaugh, professor of international affairs and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, dropped a bombshell with his essay titled 'The Coming Chinese Crackup', published as an opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal on March 6 (online version).

In this outspoken article, the renowned specialist on China's domestic politics presents five major reasons for the coming collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): rising numbers of members of the economic elites who emigrate or plan to do so, escalating political repression as a sign of heightened regime insecurity, feigned compliance of regime loyalists, widespread systemic corruption and, finally, a stuttering economy that is stuck in traps.

Shambaugh concludes:

'We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase. The CCP is the world’s second-longest ruling regime (behind only North Korea), and no party can rule forever. 

Looking ahead, China-watchers should keep their eyes on the regime's instruments of control and on those assigned to use those instruments. Large numbers of citizens and party members alike are already voting with their feet and leaving the country or displaying their insincerity by pretending to comply with party dictates. 

We should watch for the day when the regime's propaganda agents and its internal security apparatus start becoming lax in enforcing the party’s writ - or when they begin to identify with dissidents; like the East German Stasi agent in the film "The Lives of Others" who came to sympathize with the targets of his spying. 

When human empathy starts to win out over ossified authority, the endgame of Chinese communism will really have begun.'

I admit to be really baffled by this harsh judgement.

Wasn't that the guy who has argued in his book 'China's Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation' from 2008 (Amazon) so very convincingly that the Chinese Communist Party is indeed a remarkably adaptive organism? Having no idea what brought about this astonishing turnaround, I am surely not the only one expressing serious misgivings about this latest assessment of the purported weaknesses of the CCP.

To name just one example, ChinaFile has asked seven experts from different fields for their comments on Shambaugh's recent thesis; most of them didn't exactly follow his lead (for their respective arguments, see here).

The controversial essay has stirred so much debate that The New York Times decided to do a follow-up interview with David Shambaugh on March 15 to give him an opportunity to clarify his point of view. In the lengthy Q&A on the Sinosphere blog, the American academic reiterates his position and elaborates on crucial matters - sounding a little more defensive than in the original article.

To be honest, I don't find his reasoning very plausible:

The CCP has managed to adapt to comparable crises rather well many times over; why the hell should the party-state implode just now?

Prognoses about the fate of the Chinese Communist Party and the regime it has established have been and will surely continue to be notoriously difficult; time and again, professional China observers have failed to foresee game-changing developments.

One of the participants in ChinaFile's aforementioned conversation, Arthur Kroeber, wisely notes:

'Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works - which could create insights into why it might stop working - critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis.'

What are your thoughts?

A new tech giant ready to go global?

Screenshot Xiaomi Global

You may have heard of 'China's Apple' by now. Tech blogs and business magazines have gone crazy lately, publishing one glowing report after another on the (indeed) compelling success story of the Chinese smartphone maker Xiaomi Corp.

Yet, the label is definitely a misnomer as the company's business model is actually very different from that of the American tech titan. Regardless, the breathtaking speed with which the Beijing-based consumer electronics outfit has stormed to the top regions of the vibrant domestic phone market has left many industry analysts in awe.

According to The Wall Street Journal (paywall), the corporation sold 61.1 million phones in 2014, up from just 18.7 million in 2013.

That makes Xiaomi the third-largest vendor of mobile handsets in the world, right behind arch-rivals Samsung and Apple. In addition, the firm is currently considered the most valuable unlisted global technology start-up. Given these impressive numbers, it is no wonder that Fast Company has named the steadily rising star one of the most innovative companies in 2014 and again in 2015.

This is all the more intriguing as Xiaomi is an absolute newcomer to China's volatile phone manufacturing arena.

Founded in 2010, the company released its first model not until the year 2011. A closer look at the management team might explain one of the reasons for the unrivalled ascendancy.

All team members studied at illustrious Chinese and & or foreign universities and subsequently worked for some of the biggest technology brands, such as Microsoft, Google, Motorola, Sina or Kingsoft, covering a wide field of expertise.

And the company was able to land a widely noticed coup by recruiting former Google employee Hugo Barra, the sole foreigner in management, who serves as head of international sales.

Co-founder and CEO Lei Jun himself, a graduate of Wuhan University, is a charismatic, extremely ambitious and forward-looking leader who stands as kind of a rock star in the native Chinese tech scene.

An astute entrepreneur with excellent networks in the industry, Lei has a long list of profitable ventures on his résumé. He founded famed software and gaming firm Kingsoft, later established Joyo.com, an online bookstore, before heading to UCWeb, a hugely popular mobile browser. He also seems to have a real knack for investing in promising start-ups, thus adding continuously to the larger Xiaomi family (for detailed figures and charts, see this informative piece in Tech in Asia).

A billionaire listed by Forbes as one of the most wealthy people in the world, Lei Jun has constantly played with his image as the Chinese Steve Jobs.

© Unknown

He publicly admitted to hold the late icon in high regard as a role model, going so far as to emulate his typical style in public performances. A smart move, because it surely garnered international attention.

The Chinese entrepreneur understands only too well how the game is played. This shouldn't distract from the fact that Lei's ambitions go much further, though. His stated objective is not to copy (an accusation, most frequently made by Apple, Xiaomi had to deal with from the very start), but to create a truly global lifestyle brand.

The so-called Mi smartphones are sold directly via the firm's web portal, thus cutting out middlemen. To further limit production costs, there are only a few models available. Besides, the firm has had no need for expensive advertising campaigns as customers are mainly attracted by word of mouth via social media.

Evidently, the adoption of a flash sales model has proved very successful; the generated hype before product launches is so massive that the stock is sold out within minutes and orders rise rapidly. To be sure, the core business strategy involves a lot more than just selling millions upon millions of slick and yet very affordable mobile phones. In fact, every phone sold is heavily subsidized.

CEO Lei Jun has said himself that the hardware is only the carrier for the content of the software platform (for a video interview with Lei by Reuters, see here). It should also be noted that Xiaomi developers have created the so-called MIUI firmware that is based on Android and highly customizable.

E-commerce is one cornerstone of China's fast-rising tech star, generating sufficient revenue to subsidize phone manufacturing. The corporation views itself first and foremost as an internet company and - if you insist on analogies - something of a Amazon / Apple / Google hybrid.

The overall product portfolio has constantly grown and now includes a variety of accessories, tablets, fitness bands, smart TVs, set-top boxes, power banks, action cams, games, apps and even smart home devices.

Currently, Xiaomi products are available in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Moreover, the company plans to expand to other fast-growing markets, including Thailand, Russia, Turkey, Brazil and Mexico, this year. The most important market outside mainland China is, not surprisingly, neighbouring India. In its attempt to gain a foothold in the country, however, the electronics outfit experienced a temporary setback late last year when it was forced to suspend all sales due to an intellectual property infringement case filed by Ericsson (the issue has been partly resolved by now and Xiaomi has been able to resume sales).

At the recent World Mobile Congress in Barcelona, Hugo Barra has announced that Xiaomi would soon open web stores in the US and Europe. Unfortunately for overseas consumers, the eagerly awaited, slickly designed quality smartphones will be missing from the offered merchandise. The new online stores will only sell accessories, such as fitness bands, headphones or power banks. Still, this could be viewed as a prudent first step to build brand awareness without running into the trap of costly technology-patent challenges that have marred other phone manufacturers for years.

(Interestingly enough, Xiaomi smartphones actually can be bought in Europe, the US or other regions already, even if the company itself doesn't sell directly. That is the turf of a whole bunch of resellers who have detected a keen interest of worldwide customers in the nice gadgets early on. For just two examples, have a look at this or this shop site.) 

To summarize, global expansion is clearly on the agenda of the inventive Chinese technology big shot, but not the top priority at present.

Until now, many Chinese companies have had a hard time in their efforts to go global and to adapt to foreign markets. It remains to be seen if China's new high-flying tech giant will be able to find a way to establish a sustainable business model and reverse the tarnished image the label 'Made in China' still holds for many consumers.

The very cautious path chosen so far might not be the worst strategy to succeed in the long run.